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Abstract
Visual cryptography encrypts the secret image into n shares (transparency)
so that only stacking a qualified number of shares can recover the secret image
by the human visual system while no information can be revealed without a
large enough number of shares. This paper investigates the (k, n)-threshold
Visual Secret Sharing (VSS) model, where one can decrypt the original image
by stacking at least k shares and get nothing with less than k shares. There are
two main approaches in the literature: codebook-based schemes and random-
grid-based schemes; the former is the case of this paper. In general, given any
positive integers k and n, it is not easy to design a valid scheme for the (k, n)-
threshold VSS model. In this paper, we propose a simple strategy to construct
an efficient scheme for the (k, n)-threshold VSS model for any positive integers
2 ≤ k ≤ n. The crucial idea is to establish a seemingly unrelated connection
between the (k, n)-threshold VSS scheme and a mathematical structure – the
generalized Pascal’s triangle. This paper improves and extends previous results
in four aspects:
• Our construction offers a unified viewpoint and covers several known re-
sults;
• The resulting scheme has a progressive-viewing property that means the
more shares being stacked together the clearer the secret image would be
revealed.
• The proposed scheme can be constructed explicitly and efficiently based
on the generalized Pascal’s triangle without a computer.
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• Performance of the proposed scheme is comparable with known results.
Keywords: Visual secret sharing scheme, Generalized Pascal’s triangle
1 Introduction
The concept of (k, n)-threshold Visual Secret Sharing (VSS) scheme proposed by Naor
and Shamir [15] is to protect a secret image by encoding it to n image shares for a
group of n participants so that only k or more participants can recover the secret
image. In a VSS scheme, every participant receives a share consisting of xeroxed
transparencies which are stacked to recover the image by the human visual system.
A feature in visual cryptography is that everything is done by the human visual
ability and no computation is required in decoding. Therefore, the contrast of the
reconstructed images is an important measurement of performance for VSS schemes.
Throughout this paper, the image considered is black-and-white. In the classic
model, a VSS scheme expands a pixel p of a binary secret image P into n shares
of m sub-pixels each to disguise the pixel p in a way that p can only be visually
perceivable with a loss of contrast by stacking at least k transparencies. According
to [15] by Naor and Shamir, a solution to the (k, n)-threshold VSS scheme consists
of two collections of n ×m Boolean matrices C0 and C1, called a codebook. Usually,
each of the two collections consists of all matrices of permutating columns of a single
matrix, which will be called a basis matrix. To share a white (black) pixel, the
dealer randomly chooses one of the matrices in C0 (C1) according to the codebook,
respectively. The chosen matrix defines the color of the m sub-pixels in each one of
the n transparencies. Following Naor and Shamir’s idea, several VSS schemes based
on the codebook method have been proposed [1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, 23].
Two main disadvantages emerge from the above 1-to-m encoding: the pixel ex-
pansion and the image distortion. To overcome the two potential disadvantages, new
schemes with 1-to-1 pixel encoding were proposed [12, 23]. The essence of their clever
idea is to use the frequency of white pixels in the black and white areas of the recov-
ered image, instead of the contrast of every single pixel, for interpreting black and
white pixels by human visual system. To this aim, instead of encoding each pixel
into pixels in a whole row, they encode each pixel of the secret image into only one
corresponding pixel in the two basis matrices restricted to a single column (chosen
randomly). In fact, according to [12, 23], one can easily translate a traditional VSS
scheme with m pixel expansion to a new VSS scheme using 1-to-1 encoding so as to
avoid the expansion and the distortion. Furthermore, the codebook in a conventional
scheme still offers the basis matrices C0 and C1 in a new scheme.
Since [15], “how to construct the two basis matrices C0 and C1?” has been the
focus of the study of (k, n)-threshold VSS schemes. Meanwhile, progressive visual
secret sharing (PVSS) schemes have been proposed in recent years [2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11,
14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]; namely, the contrast of the proposed scheme is increasing
progressively with more and more shares being stacked together. For a particular
integer k, there are various constructions of basis matrices of a (k, n)-threshold PVSS
scheme. Hou and Quan [11] found that the codebook of the (2, n)-threshold VSS
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scheme by [15] can be used as the basis matrices for a (2, n)-threshold PVSS scheme.
In fact, the codebook of the (3, n)-threshold VSS scheme in [15] is a PVSS scheme.
Chen and Juan [3] proposed a construction of basis matrices for a (4, n)-threshold
PVSS scheme.
In general, given any positive integers k and n, the codebook of a (k, n)-threshold
VSS scheme is not easy to generate immediately. Instead, some turned to find schemes
with no codebook, which are based on a so-called random grid method; see [4, 9, 16,
17, 19, 20, 21, 22] for references. Chen and Tsao in 2011 [4] obtained a general
result for the (k, n)-threshold PVSS scheme by using a random grid. Several studies
[9, 20, 22] have subsequently continued and extended their work. Recently, Yan et al.
in 2018 [21] have found a new random-grid-based PVSS scheme improving previous
results [4, 9, 20] upon visual quality in practice, although the contrast of the proposed
scheme cannot be obtained directly by the given parameters. Random-grid-based VSS
schemes can tackle the problem of pixel expansion and codebook design, however, it
is thought to suffer from a poor visual quality of the recovered secret image since the
background becomes darker when more shares are stacked together.
Some [5, 6, 10, 13, 18] designed algorithms to find codebooks for general (k, n)-
threshold VSS schemes under a specific goal, like optimizing contrast or pixel expan-
sion, where the contrast α (will be defined later) and the pixel expansion m (the
size of basis matrices) are the major efficiency standard for a scheme. Droste [5]
was the first to analyze the optimal solution for α and m of a (k, n)-threshold VSS
scheme, where a method of computing a lower bound of m, as well as an upper bound
of α, was provided. Kotoh and Imai [13] constructed the basis matrices by solving
a linear system and resulted in the same pixel expansion as Droste’s construction.
With an elaborated linear programming, the optimal pixel expansion of a general
(k, n)-threshold VSS scheme was obtained by Shyu and Chen [18], and by Eisen and
Stinson [6] for k = 2. Hofmeister et al. [10] were the first to compute the exact value
of the optimal contrast and proved that the optimal contrast is always achievable by
a (k, n)-threshold VSS scheme that can be constructed by solving a linear program.
However, solving a program can be time-consuming, and thus designing codebooks
in an efficient fashion is highly desirable.
A recent paper by Chen, Huang and Juan [2] has revealed a simple method to
design the codebooks of general (k, n)-threshold PVSS schemes. Precisely, for any
given positive integers k and n, the codebook of the (k, n)-threshold PVSS scheme can
be obtained efficiently and directly by a formula. The general formula therein extends
the (4, n)-threshold PVSS scheme by Chen and Juan [3] to the cases of large k. The
authors [2] also show that the performance, including contrast, size constraint and
pixel expansion, of their method is comparable with previous results [3, 4, 8, 9, 15, 19,
20, 21, 22]. However, the formula would be unsatisfied in a theoretical point of view
because it seems quite complicated and cannot unify the well-known constructions of
(k, n)-threshold PVSS schemes for k = 2, 3 and n by Naor and Shamir [15]. Over the
past few years, all the studies of designing codebooks for the (k, n)-threshold PVSS
schemes have been worked out case by case. With more designs being revealed, it
raises naturally an interesting question that “is there a single formula to unify all
these constructions?” To this aim, Chen et al. [2] made a first attempt, which helps
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us to see the possibility of answering such a question.
The main contribution of this paper is to improve not only the performance but
also the design method proposed by Chen et al. [2]. We show that, with no computer
or even with no complicated formula, one can easily construct the codebook of a (k, n)-
threshold PVSS scheme for any general 2 ≤ k ≤ n. The key to this improvement
is to discover a seemingly unrelated but beautiful connection between codebooks
of (k, n)-threshold PVSS schemes and the well-known generalized Pascal’s triangle.
All constructions can be obtained explicitly from the generalized Pascal’s triangle
according to a simple rule. Our results cover several previous known results [2, 3,
11, 15] as special cases; moreover, using a combinatorial identity, a simple proof is
provided in a theoretical way in Combinatorics.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, some prior knowledge
and notations are described. Section 3 introduces the connection between the code-
book and the generalized Pascal’s triangle. The main results and proofs are provided
in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude this paper with some comparison and
discussion.
2 Preliminaries
This section starts with some definitions and previous results. Throughout this paper
matrices are equivalent up to column permutation. We use Mnj to denote a binary
matrix of size n × (n
j
)
, where every column vector is different from each other and
has a constant column weight j. For matrices M1,M2, · · · ,Mt all have the same row
dimension, let M = [M0,M1, · · · ,Mt] denote the horizontal concatenation of these
matrices M1,M2, · · · ,Mt along rows. For any positive integer c and any matrix M ,
we define cM = [M,M, · · · ,M ] to be concatenating horizontally the matrix M c
times. For example,
M30 =
00
0
 ,M31 =
1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
 ,M32 =
1 1 01 0 1
0 1 1
 ,M33 =
11
1
 ,
and
[2M30 ,M
3
3 ] =
0 0 10 0 1
0 0 1
 .
The matrices Mnj ’s are called totally symmetric matrices in [3, 10]. It has been
shown in [10] that the optimal contrast value can always be achieved by a scheme
using totally symmetric matrices as its basis matrices. Various constructions for
(k, n)-threshold VSS schemes based on concatenating some of the matrices Mnj ’s are
proposed in the literature of Visual Cryptography. To illustrate a simple example, we
demonstrate a (2, 2)-threshold VSS scheme using the following collections of matrices:
C0 = {all the matrices obtained by permutating the columns of
[
0 1
0 1
]
},
4
C1 = {all the matrices obtained by permutating the columns of
[
0 1
1 0
]
}.
Traditionally, the dealer first randomly choose two matrices C0 and C1 from the
above codebook, respectively. Each pixel of the secret image can be encoded into
two sub-pixels of the two shares directly: the first row represents the share 1 and the
second row represents the share 2. No matter what type the secret pixel is, each share
receives two sub-pixels with a “0”(white) and a “1”(black), and thus cannot obtain
enough information on the secret pixel. When two shares are stacked together in a
way properly aligning the sub pixels, we can represent the superimposed share pixels
by “OR” operation of rows, where “OR” operation means 0+0 = 0, 0+1 = 1+0 = 1,
and 1 + 1 = 1 as shown in the following figure. In the (2, 2)-threshold VSS scheme
Figure 1: The “OR” operation for black and white sub-pixels
above, if the secret pixel is black, then the superimposed share pixels result in two
black pixels; however, if the secret pixel is white, then the superimposed share pixels
result in one black pixel and one white pixel. This difference makes every secret
pixel distinguishable by the human visual system, and thus the secret image is also
distinguishable after stacking two shares. Nevertheless, the disadvantage of the pixel
expansion could lead to a poor quality of the obtained image.
A method of translating a traditional VSS scheme with m pixel expansion to a
new VSS scheme without pixel expansion was proposed in [12, 23]. The following
definition is adapted from Yang’s definition [23] with a slight modification.
Definition 1. A (k, n)-threshold Visual Secret Sharing (VSS) scheme can be shown
as two basis matrices of size n × m: white matrix C0 and black matrix C1. When
sharing a white (resp. black) pixel, the dealer first randomly chooses one column in
C0 (resp. C1), and then defines the color level of the pixel in every one of the n shares
correspondingly. A (k, n)-threshold VSS scheme is considered valid if the following
conditions hold:
1. For any q-subset Q of {1, 2, · · · , n} with q ≥ k, pw(Q)− pb(Q) ≥ α > 0, where
pw(Q) and pb(Q) are the appearance probabilities of 0-entry in the “OR” vectors
in C0 and C1, respectively, restricted to the q rows indexed by the q-subset Q,
and α is the contrast;
2. For any q-subset Q of {1, 2, · · · , n} with q < k, pw(Q) = pb(Q).
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The first condition defines the contrast α, which is a measurement depending on
the appearance probability of the reconstructed white and black pixels; while the
second condition is about security which implies that by stacking less than k shares
one cannot obtain enough information on the secret image.
Example 2. Take the (2, 2)-threshold VSS scheme mentioned above for an example.
Consider the two basis matrices C0 =
[
0 1
0 1
]
and C1 =
[
0 1
1 0
]
. For the only 2-subset
Q = {1, 2}, the “OR” vector restricted to Q, i.e., stacking the two shares, in C0 and
C1 are (0, 1) and (1, 1), respectively. From the definition pw(Q) and pb(Q) are the
appearance probability of 0-entry in the “OR” vector in C0 and C1, respectively, and
thus pw(Q) − pb(Q) = 1/2 − 0/2 = 1/2. Similarly, for any 1-subset Q = {1} or {2}
the “OR” vector restrict to Q is indeed a single row and obviously pw(Q)− pb(Q) =
1/2 − 1/2 = 0. Thus, the two basis matrices are valid for a (2, 2)-threshold VSS
scheme.
Depending on the parameters k and n, there are various designs of codebooks for
(k, n)-threshold VSS schemes based on totally symmetric matrices. Naor and Shamir
[15] proposed the following three constructions:
• For a solution of a (2, n)-threshold PVSS scheme, set the matrices C0 = [(n −
1)Mn0 ,M
n
n ] and C1 = [M
n
1 ] as the basis matrices.
• For a solution of a (3, n)-threshold PVSS scheme, set the matrices C0 = [(n −
2)Mn0 ,M
n
n−1] and C1 = [M
n
1 , (n− 2)Mnn ] as the the basis matrices.
• For a solution of a (n, n)-threshold VSS scheme, set the matrices C0 = [Mn0 ,Mn2 , · · · ]
concatenating all Mnj ’s with even weight and C1 = [M
n
1 ,M
n
3 , · · · ] concatenating
all Mnj ’s with odd weight as the basis matrices.
Chen and Juan [3] proposed a (4, n)-threshold PVSS scheme by setting the matrices
C0 = [
n2−5n+6
2
Mn0 ,M
n
2 , (n−3)Mnn ] and C1 = [(n−3)Mn1 ,Mnn−1] as the basis matrices.
To observe mathematical patterns, we represent the above results by using a single
formula of Mnj ’s in the form a0M
n
0 −a1Mn1 +· · ·+(−1)jajMnj +· · ·+(−1)nanMnn , where
|(−1)jaj|Mnj is in C0 if (−1)jaj ≥ 0, and |(−1)jaj|Mnj is in C1 for otherwise. Note that
the representation is not self-conflicted because the mentioned results are all about
the matrices Mnj ’s, and moreover each M
n
j appears in at most one of C0 and C1. We
call (a0, a1, · · · , an) the coefficient sequence of the basis matrices. Previous results are
summarized in Table 1. Given a coefficient sequence, we can learn all contents in the
basis matrices C0 and C1. Obviously, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
basis matrices and its coefficient sequence. The one-to-one correspondence is crucial
in the discussion in the rest of this paper. For the purpose of developing a general
construction of basis matrices for (k, n)-threshold PVSS schemes, this correspondence
suggests that we need not to construct basis matrices directly but only need to simply
study its coefficient sequence.
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Reference Model Coefficient Sequence
Naor & Shamir (2, n)-threshold (n− 1, 1, 0, 0, · · · , 0, (−1)n)
Naor & Shamir (3, n)-threshold (n− 2, 1, 0, 0, · · · , 0, (−1)n−1, (−1)n−1(n− 2))
Naor & Shamir (n, n)-threshold (1, 1, · · · , 1)
Chen & Juan (4, n)-threshold (n
2−5n+6
2
, n− 3, 1, 0, 0, · · · , 0, (−1)n, (−1)n(n− 3))
Table 1: Previous results with coefficient sequences
3 Connection to Generalized Pascal’s triangle
For 0 ≤M ≤ N ,
(N
M
)
is commonly used to denote the number of combinations of
N items taken M at a time, called N choose M. It is also known as the binomial
coefficient of the xM term in the expression of the binomial power (1 + x)N . The
well-known Pascal’s triangle is a triangular array of the binomial coefficients, where
the value of the (N ,M) entry in the N -th row andM-th column is
(N
M
)
, as shown
in the following table.
N \M 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1
1 1 1
2 1 2 1
3 1 3 3 1
4 1 4 6 4 1
5 1 5 10 10 5 1
6 1 6 15 20 15 6 1
7 1 7 21 35 35 21 7 1
8 1 8 28 56 70 56 28 8 1
9 1 9 36 84 126 126 84 36 9 1
The entries in Pascal’s triangle obey a rule that each number is the sum of the two
numbers directly above it. This can be written as the well-known Pascal’s formula:(N
M
)
=
(N − 1
M− 1
)
+
(N − 1
M
)
.
In mathematics, Pascal’s triangle can be extended to the case of negative row
indexes, i.e., N < 0. To this aim, define (NM) = 1 for any integer N if M = 0, and
then rewrite the above formula as(N − 1
M
)
=
(N
M
)
−
(N − 1
M− 1
)
,
which leads to a simple calculation of the entries for negative row indexes. This
extension preserves the property that the values in the M-th column can be viewed
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as a polynomial function of N of degree M; namely,(N
M
)
=
1
M!
M∏
i=1
(N + 1− i).
Such an extension also preserves the property that the values in the N -th row cor-
respond to the coefficients of (1 + x)N for |x| < 1. For example, (1 + x)−2 =
1 − 2x + 3x2 − 4x3 + · · · . Obviously, with Pascal’s formula, the generalized Pas-
cal’s triangle can be produced easily without a computer. Table 2 is part of the
generalized Pascal’s triangle.
N \M 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-8 1 -8 36 -120 330 -792 1716 -3432 6435 -11440 19448
-7 1 -7 28 -84 210 -462 924 -1716 3003 -5005 8008
-6 1 -6 21 -56 126 -252 462 -792 1287 -2002 3003
-5 1 -5 15 -35 70 -126 210 -330 495 -715 1001
-4 1 -4 10 -20 35 -56 84 -120 165 -220 286
-3 1 -3 6 -10 15 -21 28 -36 45 -55 66
-2 1 -2 3 -4 5 -6 7 -8 9 -10 11
-1 1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 4 6 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 5 10 10 5 1 0 0 0 0 0
6 1 6 15 20 15 6 1 0 0 0 0
7 1 7 21 35 35 21 7 1 0 0 0
8 1 8 28 56 70 56 28 8 1 0 0
9 1 9 36 84 126 126 84 36 9 1 0
Table 2: The generalized Pascal’s triangle with small parameters
Next, we offer a novel perspective that unifies the results mentioned in Table 1.
Example 3. In the (2, n)-threshold VSS scheme by Naor and Shamir [15], its co-
efficient sequence can be found in the generalized Pascal’s triangle. Precisely, the
sequence starts from the (n − 1, n − 2) entry and up to the (−1, n − 2) entry. Tak-
ing n = 4 for instance, the coefficient sequence (3, 1, 0, 0, 1) corresponds to the basis
matrices
C0 = [3M
4
0 ,M
4
4 ] =

0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
 and C1 = [M41 ] =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
.
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Example 4. According to the (3, n)-threshold VSS scheme by Naor and Shamir [15],
its coefficient sequence starts from the (n− 2, n− 3) entry and up to the (−2, n− 3)
entry. Taking n = 4 for instance, the coefficient sequence (2, 1, 0,−1,−2) corresponds
to the basis matrices
C0 = [2M
4
0 ,M
4
3 ] =

0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1
 and C1 = [M41 , 2M44 ] =

1 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1
.
Example 5. According to the (4, n)-threshold VSS scheme by Chen and Juan [3], its
coefficient sequence starts from the (n−2, n−4) entry and up to the (−2, n−4) entry.
Taking n = 5 for instance, the coefficient sequence (3, 2, 1, 0,−1,−2) corresponds to
the basis matrices
C0 = [3M
5
0 ,M
5
2 , 2M
5
5 ] =

0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1

and
C1 = [2M
5
1 ,M
5
4 ] =

1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
 .
4 Main results
In this section, we first show the main construction of basis matrices for general
(k, n)-threshold VSS schemes and then prove its correctness and efficiency.
Construction 6. Given any positive integers k and n with 2 ≤ k ≤ n, let C0 and
C1 be the basis matrices whose coefficient sequence starts from the (n − dk2e, n − k)
entry and up to the (−dk
2
e, n− k) entry in the generalized Pascal’s triangle.
The proposed design is flexible to apply to any k ≤ n and easy to implement
because the basis matrices can be obtained immediately from the generalized Pascal’s
triangle. It is not difficult to see from Example 3, Example 4 and Example 5 that each
of the mentioned results is a special case of our construction. This construction offers
a systematic method to produce basis matrices for (k, n)-threshold PVSS schemes.
Theorem 7. Given any positive integers k and n with 2 ≤ k ≤ n, the basis matrices
C0 and C1 in Construction 6 are valid for a (k, n)-threshold PVSS scheme.
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To prove Theorem 7, we need the following extension of combinatorial identities.
Recall that
(N
M
)
=
1
M!
M∏
i=1
(N + 1 − i). For any formal power series P (x), denote
[xq]P (x) the coefficient of the term xq in P (x), e.g., if P (x) = 1 + 2x+ 5x3 +x4, then
[x3]P (x) = 5.
Lemma 8. Let s and t be nonnegative integers, and let r be an integer. Then
t∑
i=0
(−1)t−i
(
t
t− i
)(
s+ r + i
s
)
=
{
0 if t ≥ s+ 1,(
s+r
s−t
)
if t ≤ s. (1)
Proof. By definition, we have the generating functions
P (x) =
1
(1 + x)s+1
=
∑
i≥0
(−(s+ 1)
i
)
xi =
∑
i≥0
(−1)i
(
s+ i
i
)
xi
and
Q(x) = (1 + x)t =
∑
i≥0
(
t
i
)
xi.
If r ≥ 0, then
t∑
i=0
(−1)t−i
(
t
t− i
)(
s+ r + i
s
)
= (−1)t+r
t∑
i=0
(
t
t− i
)
(−1)r+i
(
s+ r + i
r + i
) (
(−1)t−i = (−1)t+i = (−1)t+r · (−1)r+i
)
= (−1)t+r
t∑
i=0
(
[xt−i]Q(x)
)(
[xr+i]P (x)
)
= (−1)t+r[xt+r]
(
(1 + x)t · 1
(1 + x)s+1
)
(convolution of the generating functions)
= (−1)t+r[xt+r](1 + x)t−s−1
= (−1)t+r
(
t− s− 1
t+ r
)
= (−1)t+r (t− s− 1)(t− s− 2) · · · (t− s− (t+ r))
(t+ r)!
.
Therefore, if r ≥ 0, then we obtain
t∑
i=0
(−1)t−i
(
t
t− i
)(
s+ r + i
s
)
=
 0 if t ≥ s+ 1,(s+ r
s− t
)
if t ≤ s.
Treat two sides of the above equation as polynomial functions of r, i.e., f(r) and g(r).
Notice that f(r) and g(r) have a finite degree. As f(r) = g(r) holds for infinitely many
r (all integers r ≥ 0), by the Identity Theorem for polynomials, we have f(r) = g(r)
for all integers r < 0. Hence, Equation (1) holds for any integer r, as desired.
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Proof of Theorem 7. Suppose that C0 and C1 are basis matrices corresponding
to the coefficient sequence starting from the (n − dk
2
e, n − k) entry and up to the
(−dk
2
e, n − k) entry in the generalized Pascal’s triangle. We first verify that C0 and
C1 are of the same size n×m; the difference of the numbers of columns in C0 and C1
is
n∑
i=0
(−1)n−i
(
n
n− i
)(−dk
2
e+ i
n− k
)
=
n∑
i=0
(−1)n−i
(
n
n− i
)(
n− k + r + i
n− k
)
( setting r = −dk
2
e − n+ k)
= 0. ( by Lemma 8 with t = n > n− k = s)
For the conditions concerning security and contrast, we want to prove that if q < k
then pw(Q)− pb(Q) = 0 and if q ≥ k then pw(Q)− pb(Q) > 0 for any q shares being
stacked, where Q is any q-subset of {1, 2, · · · , n}. Since C0 and C1 are of the same
size, it suffices to focus on the difference of the numbers of appearance of 0-entry in
the “or” vectors in C0 and C1 restricted to a q-subset Q; that is
n−q∑
i=0
(−1)n−q−i
(
n− q
n− q − i
)(
q − dk
2
e+ i
n− k
)
=
n−q∑
i=0
(−1)n−q−i
(
n− q
n− q − i
)(
n− k + r + i
n− k
)
(2)
where the equality holds by setting r = q − dk
2
e − n+ k.
If q < k, then n − q ≥ n − k + 1 and thus by Lemma 8 we obtain the above
formula (2) = 0. This verifies the security condition. If q ≥ k, then by Lemma 8 we
get (2) =
(
n− k + r
q − k
)
=
(
q − dk
2
e
q − k
)
=
(
q − dk
2
e
k − dk
2
e
)
, which is an increasing function of
q and has the minimum value 1 when q = k. Hence, the contrast α =
(
q − dk
2
e
q − k
)
/m
is positive and increases progressively for any q ≥ k shares being stacked. This
completes the proof of Theorem 7.
We remark that the coefficient sequence in Construction 1 can start from any
entry in the (n− k)-th column and still works as a valid scheme because this affects
only the parameter r in Lemma 8. Thus, the above proof works as well. Note
that the codebook of the (k, n)-threshold PVSS scheme proposed in [2] is a special
case whose coefficient sequence starting from the (n− k + 2, n− k) entry and up to
the (−k+ 2, n− k) entry. By performing basic calculations, we find that shifting the
coefficient sequence of length n+1 to the nearly symmetry position in the generalized
Pascal’s triangle yields a minimum size m of basis matrices. Therefore, starting from
the (n−dk
2
e, n−k) entry and up to the (−dk
2
e, n−k) entry, as in our construction, is
the best choice for the contrast α. The coefficient sequences of the mentioned results
can be found in the generalized Pascal’s triangle, as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Visualization of the coefficient sequences of the mentioned results in the
generalized Pascal’s triangle
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k \ n 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7 1/8 1/9 1/10
OPT 1/2 1/3 1/3 3/10 3/10 2/7 2/7 5/18 5/18
3 1/4 1/6 1/8 1/10 1/12 1/14 1/16 1/18
OPT 1/4 1/6 1/8 1/10 1/10 2/21 5/56 1/12
4 1/8 1/15 1/24 1/35 1/48 1/63 1/80
OPT 1/8 1/15 1/18 3/70 3/80 2/63 1/35
Table 3: The contrast α of the resulting (k, n)-threshold VSS scheme and the optimal
contrast (OPT) by linear programming in [10].
5 Concluding remarks
For general 2 ≤ k ≤ n, we have shown that there exists an explicit construction for
the basis matrices C0 and C1 of a (k, n)-threshold PVSS scheme. The contrast α of
the schemes constructed according to Construction 1 can be described as this formula(
q−d k
2
e
q−k
)
/m, where
m =
∑
i≡n (mod 2)
(−d
k
2 e+i
n−k )≥0
(
n
n− i
)(−dk
2
e+ i
n− k
)
+
∑
i≡n−1 (mod 2)
(−d
k
2 e+i
n−k )<0
(
n
n− i
)(−dk
2
e+ i
n− k
)
=
1
2
∑
i
(
n
n− i
) ∣∣∣∣(−dk2e+ in− k
)∣∣∣∣
is the number of columns of C1. Some results of the contrast by stacking exactly k
shares are listed in Table 3, where theoretically optimal values computed in [10] are
also listed and marked “OPT”. Unfortunately, as shown in Table 3, the contrast of
the resulting scheme by stacking exactly k shares meets the optimal bound only when
n is small. However, the optimal contrast proposed in [10] counts only for exactly k
shares being stacked and their scheme is not a PVSS scheme; thus, by stacking more
and more shares, the contrast of our scheme can be higher than their result.
Take n = 8 and k = 3 for an example. Their basis matrices are C0 = [14M
8
0 ,M
8
6 ]
and C1 = [M
8
2 , 14M
8
8 ] while ours are C0 = [6M
8
0 ,M
8
7 ] and C1 = [M
8
4 , 6M
8
8 ]. It
is straightforward to verify that the contrast of our result is better in the cases of
q = 7, 8 shares being stacked. The results of the contrast α by stacking q ≥ 3 shares
are listed in the following Table 4 for comparison.
The crucial idea behind our construction is all about a well-known mathematical
structure – the generalized Pascal’s triangle. This provides us a simple way to gen-
eralize some of the previous results in [2, 3, 15] on (k, n)-threshold PVSS schemes
systematically. We also notice that, with small k and n, the algorithmic construction
based on fully symmetric matrices proposed by Droste [5] yields the same basis ma-
trices with ours for a (k, n)-threshold PVSS scheme. Intuitively, we suspect, without
a proof, that Droste’s algorithm eventually outputs the same codebook as that in
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q 3 4 5 6 7 8
Ours 1/14 2/14 3/14 4/14 5/14 6/14
∨ ∨
[10] 4/42 8/42 11/42 13/42 14/42 14/42
Table 4: Comparison of the contrast α in (3, 8)-threshold VSS schemes when stacking
q shares
our construction even if the parameters k and n are large. It would be interesting to
investigate the connection behind the coincidence (see Table 5). Remarkably, even if
such a coincidence exists, our method is much better than that in [5] in computation
complexity; thus, it does not mean that the main result of this paper is covered by
[5]. Conversely, such a connection highlights potential applications of the fundamental
structures of pure mathematics to the constructions of the codebooks.
k \ n 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
4 8 15 24 35 48 63 80
5 16 30 48 70 96 126
6 32 70 128 210 320
7 64 140 256 420
8 128 315 640
9 256 630
10 512
Table 5: The column size m of the resulting (k, n)-threshold PVSS scheme is the
same with that produced by Droste’s algorithm [5].
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